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THE TECH GIANTS, MONOPOLY POWER, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

In November 2019, the Knight First Amendment 
Institute convened a major symposium at Columbia 
University, titled “The Tech Giants, Monopoly Power, 
and Public Discourse,” to address concerns arising 
from the dominance of a small number of technology 
companies over a wide range of economic and 
expressive activity. The essays in this series were 
originally presented and discussed at this two-day 
event. Written by scholars and experts in law, computer 
science, economics, information studies, journalism, 
political science, and other disciplines, the essays 
focus on two questions: how and to what extent the 
technology giants’ power is shaping public discourse, 
and whether anti-monopoly tools might usefully be 
deployed to expose or counter this power. 
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight Institute 
staff, including Jameel Jaffer, Executive Director; Katy 
Glenn Bass, Research Director; Alex Abdo, Litigation 
Director; and Larry Siems, Chief of Staff. The essay 
series was edited by Glenn Bass with additional 
support from Lorraine Kenny, Communications 
Director; Sarah Guinee, Research Fellow; and Madeline 
Wood, Communications and Research Coordinator. 
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/
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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment seeks to promote a robust marketplace of ideas, and antitrust law seeks to promote a robust marketplace of goods and services. To what extent are these principles related 
or even intertwined? To what extent do free speech and free competition 
share common ground when it comes to state interventions that may limit 
free exchange in small ways but promote free exchange in bigger ways? For 
instance, an exclusive legal right to a news story may prevent its broad dis-
semination and hence limit the right of others to speak and to compete, but 
also enable the creation of the story in the first place. Or legal intervention to 
require a dominant news provider to collaborate with its smaller competitors 
may constrain the dominant firm’s editorial and competitive prerogatives, 
but also serve the larger goal of marketplace pluralism by facilitating the 
participation of more voices and more competitors.
These questions concerning the relationship between exclusivity, coer-
cion, collaboration, and competition in information and news were raised 
in parallel during the formative years of contemporary First Amendment 
and antitrust law—and they have abiding importance today. Although the 
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First Amendment predated the Sherman Act by a century, First Amendment 
jurisprudence and antirust jurisprudence developed during the same period, 
and at the hands of the same jurists. It was the sweep of dissenting and 
concurring opinions by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis between 
1919 and 1927 that gave birth to modern First Amendment jurisprudence.1 It 
was also shortly before or during this period that Holmes and Brandeis left 
an indelible mark on antitrust law in such decisions as Holmes’s recognition 
of the Sherman Act’s broad jurisdictional reach2 and rejection of void-for-
vagueness arguments3 and, particularly, Brandeis’s seminal decision on 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade v. 
United States.4
The nurturing of the early First Amendment and antitrust jurisprudences 
was not merely coincident in time but also coincident thematically. In cases 
concerning antitrust or unfair competition, Holmes and Brandeis expressed 
the same values and concerns that animated their First Amendment juris-
prudence. Working through dissenting opinions much as in the First Amend-
ment cases, they opposed both restraints on free competition necessary to the 
propagation of information, on the one hand, and government restrictions of 
collaborative information-sharing on the other. Seeking to work out the rela-
tionship between exclusivity, collaboration, and competition, Holmes and 
Brandeis argued that the government should neither promote informational 
exclusivity through the imposition of tort liability for unfair competition, nor 
stand in the way of voluntary and noncoercive efforts to facilitate the free 
flow of market information and democratic market access.
Holmes’s and Brandeis’s dissents planted the seed of an idea about the 
roles that antitrust, competition, and free speech could play in nurturing 
marketplace democracy—an organization of industry in which a multi-
plicity of firms could freely enter and participate to meet the varied needs 
and demands of consumers. During the New Deal period, especially when 
Brandeis’s “anti-Bigness” views became the prevailing antitrust ideology,5 
the Justice Department began to bring antitrust cases in the newspaper 
industry on the theory that restraints on newspaper competition by domi-
nant newspapers resulted not only in higher prices but also fundamentally 
challenged the functioning of a free press and the marketplace of ideas. But 
the initiation of antitrust prosecutions against news organizations raised 
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a different free speech question—whether the First Amendment barred the 
government from imposing its own vision of information freedom on dom-
inant news organizations. Two competing visions of antitrust and a free 
press—one focused on the rights of dominant newspapers and the other on 
the rights of readers and smaller papers—reached the Supreme Court in 1945, 
in Associated Press v. United States.6 Even as it struck down the Associated 
Press’s bylaws allowing members to block local competitors from member-
ship and rejecting the argument that such antitrust intervention infringed 
the free press rights of incumbent newspapers, Justice Hugo Black’s majority 
opinion refused to join the constructivist view of a free press that held that 
the government should aggressively deploy antitrust law to promote First 
Amendment values. Instead, Black insisted that anticompetitive restraints in 
news media should be judged by the same standards—no more and no less—
as restraints in other industries. Hence, the First Amendment would neither 
stand in the way of antitrust prosecutions involving news and information 
nor would it provide any additional impetus for such cases.
From Associated Press forward, the Justice Department continued to play 
an active role in policing anticompetitive restraints in news and information. 
Legal complaints and court decisions sometimes resonated with Brandeis 
and Holmes about the value to freedom and democracy of the unrestricted 
exchange of news, viewpoints, and information. As time passed, however, 
antitrust cases involving news and information began to focus increas-
ingly on price effects and economic efficiency, and First Amendment values 
receded from the discussion. The project begun by Holmes and Brandeis—of 
thinking about exclusivity, collaboration, and competition as issues of mar-
ketplace democracy—largely faded from view.
Today, the questions posed by Holmes and Brandeis are again on the 
table for consideration. Particularly with the growth of massive technology 
gatekeepers like Google, Facebook, and Amazon, who sit upon mountains of 
data and control essential channels of information, the time is again ripe for 
thinking about the role of exclusivity, coercion, cooperation, and competition 
in the marketplaces of ideas and industry.
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HOLMES AND BRANDEIS ON COMPETITION AND 
COERCION IN NEWS AND INFORMATION
The awakening of the First Amendment in the years immediately following the First World War in concurring or dissenting opinions by Justices Holmes and Brandeis is “one of the most familiar devel-
opments in American constitutional history.”7 Among the many memorable 
ideas advanced by Holmes and Brandeis in those early years of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, perhaps none stands out more than the “marketplace 
of ideas” metaphor advanced by Holmes (joined by Brandeis) in his first 
libertarian free speech dissent, in Abrams v. United States: “But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundation of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.”8 
The Holmes/Brandeis vision of ideas competing with other ideas in a free 
market had obvious resonance for the broader organization of the economy 
and industrial competition, and Holmes and Brandeis were thinking about 
those issues at the same time as they began seriously to contemplate the 
First Amendment. At the same time that the Justices were wrestling with the 
meaning of free speech in cases involving espionage and criminal syndical-
ism, they had occasion to ponder the effects that legal-economic rules might 
have on the free flow of information in the news media and industry more 
broadly. Their dissents in two cases involving antitrust and unfair competi-
tion—International News Service v. Associated Press9 and American Column 
& Lumber Co. v. United States10—brought their First Amendment values to 
questions of economic competition and organization.
International News Service v. Associated Press involved a common law 
unfair competition claim by the Associated Press (AP) against International 
News Service (INS) for the misappropriation of “hot news.”11 AP sought to 
enjoin INS from bribing AP newspaper members to leak AP stories to INS in 
advance of publication and copying news from bulletin boards and early 
editions of AP newspapers and selling it to INS customers. AP claimed a 
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property right to its news, not by virtue of federal copyright but at common 
law. At the Supreme Court, the majority upheld the unfair competition law 
claim, holding that “[t]he parties are competitors in this field; and, on funda-
mental principles, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges 
of the one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under 
a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to 
injure that of the other.”12
Both Holmes and Brandeis issued dissenting opinions. To Holmes, the 
question came down to whether there could be “property in the combina-
tion or in the thoughts or facts that words express.”13 Holmes believed that 
thoughts could not be propertized—that they remain in the public domain 
even though they are generated by individuals and are economically valu-
able. Unless the INS was misrepresenting the AP’s thoughts as originally 
its own, there could be no common law tort claim. As in Abrams,14 Holmes 
viewed ideas as free to travel until they found their resting place in human 
opinions.
Brandeis shared Holmes’s view that thoughts and ideas could not be 
propertized: “The general rule of law is that the noblest of human produc-
tions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—became, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”15 
Like Holmes, he would have held that mere appropriation of the ideas of 
another, without fraudulent passing off as if they were the speaker’s own, 
could not constitute a tort. Brandeis, however, went further than Holmes in 
stressing the procompetition value at stake in permitting free appropriation 
of ideas by competitors:
That competition is not unfair in a legal sense merely because the profits 
gained are unearned, even if made at the expense of a rival, is shown by 
many cases besides those referred to above. He who follows the pioneer 
into a new market, or who engages in the manufacture of an article newly 
introduced by another, seeks profits due largely to the labor and expense of 
the first adventurer, but the law sanctions, indeed encourages, the pursuit.16
Here, Brandeis was drawing on an old common law principle—that com-
petition may be painful to rivals is of no moment to the law.17 People should 
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be free in competition to appropriate and propagate the ideas of others, for 
that is the nature of a free market and a free society.
Brandeis and Holmes returned to the relationship between competition 
and information dissemination three years later in an antitrust case involving 
information exchange among competitors—American Column & Lumber Co. 
v. United States.18 The case is generally overshadowed by the information 
exchange decision of four years later in Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Assn. 
v. United States,19 which did not draw a dissent from Holmes or Brandeis, 
but it was in American Column that Brandeis20 and Holmes21 continued the 
articulation of their view that the law should not impede the free flow of 
information, either to aid a competitor against another or to aid consumers 
as against producers.
The American Hardware Manufacturers’ Association consisted of 400 
members operating 465 hardwood mills, one-third of the total production in 
the United States.22 In 1918, that body adopted an “Open Competition Plan” 
with the purpose of “disseminat[ing] among members accurate knowledge 
of production and market conditions so that each member may gauge the 
market intelligently instead of guessing at it; to make competition open and 
above board instead of secret and concealed; to substitute, in estimating 
market conditions, frank and full statements of our competitors for the 
frequently misleading and colored statements of the buyer.”23 The group 
served as a “central clearing house for information on prices, trade statistics 
and practices” among its members.24 Among other things, the association 
promulgated monthly or weekly reports to its members on various categories 
of competitive information collected from its members, including mem-
ber-specific production levels and purchaser-level pricing information.25
In the Supreme Court, the majority opinion of Justice John Hessin Clarke 
found this scheme a naked “competition suppressing organization” lacking 
only a definite agreement on prices to make it an obvious form of price fix-
ing.26 Holmes and Brandeis dissented, finding the voluntary and noncoercive 
exchange of information critically important to the functioning of a free and 
egalitarian society.
Holmes’s often-overlooked two-paragraph dissent is worth printing in 
its entirety:
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When there are competing sellers of a class of goods, knowledge of the 
total stock on hand, of the probable total demand, and of the prices paid, 
of course will tend to equalize the prices asked. But I should have supposed 
that the Sherman Act did not set itself against knowledge—did not aim at a 
transitory cheapness unprofitable to the community as a whole because not 
corresponding to the actual conditions of the country. I should have thought 
that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange made with full 
knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future on both sides. 
A combination to get and distribute such knowledge, notwithstanding its 
tendency to equalize, not necessarily to raise, prices, is very far from a com-
bination in unreasonable restraint of trade. It is true that it is a combination 
of sellers only, but the knowledge acquired is not secret, it is public, and the 
buyers, I think I may assume, are not less active in their efforts to know the 
facts. A combination in unreasonable restraint of trade imports an attempt 
to override normal market conditions. An attempt to conform to them seems 
to me the most reasonable thing in the world. I see nothing in the conduct 
of the appellants that binds the members even by merely social sanctions to 
anything that would not be practised, if we could imagine it, by an allwise 
socialistic government acting for the benefit of the community as a whole. 
The parties to the combination are free to do as they will.
I must add that the decree as it stands seems to me surprising in a country of 
free speech that affects to regard education and knowledge as desirable. It 
prohibits the distribution of stock, production, or sales reports, the discus-
sion of prices at association meetings, and the exchange of predictions of 
high prices. It is true that these acts are the main evidence of the supposed 
conspiracy, but that to my mind only shows the weakness of the Govern-
ment’s case. I cannot believe that the fact, if it be assumed, that the acts have 
been done with a sinister purpose, justifies excluding mills in the backwoods 
from information, in order to enable centralized purchasers to take advantage 
of their ignorance of the facts.27
Brandeis, always more verbose than the inimitable stylist Holmes but 
no less eloquent, offered his own dissenting point of view, framed through 
the archetypically Brandeisian lenses of dominance and marketplace 
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democracy. He began with an acknowledgment of the power of words to 
restrain freedom of action: “Restraint may be exerted through force or fraud 
or agreement. It may be exerted through moral or through legal obligations; 
through fear or through hope. It may exist, although it is not manifested 
in any overt act, and even though there is no intent to restrain. Words of 
advice, seemingly innocent and perhaps benevolent, may restrain, when 
uttered under circumstances that make advice equivalent to command.”28 
For Brandeis, words only had the power to restrain when they flowed from a 
position of power, of dominance: “For the essence of restraint is power; and 
power may arise merely out of position. Wherever a dominant position has 
been attained, restraint necessarily arises.” Such restraints attained through 
dominance and coercion were, to Brandeis, the heart of the Sherman Act’s 
prohibition: “And when dominance is attained, or is sought, through combi-
nation—however good the motives or the manners of those participating—the 
Sherman Law is violated, provided, of course, that the restraint be what is 
called unreasonable.”29
Brandeis then turned to the question of whether the column associa-
tion’s information exchange program reflected dominance or coercion. It 
did not: “In the case before us there was clearly no coercion.”30 The plan 
was voluntary and open; the information collected was available to buyers, 
sellers, and the general public, and meetings were open to the public—a 
point recalling Brandeis’s famous aphorism, that “[s]unlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants.”31 The information exchange might somewhat lessen 
competition, but Brandeis had already shown in Chicago Board of Trade 
that “the Sherman Act does not prohibit every lessening of competition” and 
that “[i]t is lawful to regulate competition in some degree.”32 But, continued 
Brandeis, the purpose of the Open Competition Plan was not even to regulate 
competition but rather “to make rational competition possible, by supplying 
data not otherwise available, and without which most of those engaged in 
the trade would be unable to trade intelligently.”33
As in Chicago Board of Trade, Brandeis carefully analyzed the facts con-
cerning the effects of the challenged agreement with a sympathetic eye on 
its leveling of the playing field among producers. In Chicago Board of Trade, 
Brandeis had found that the call rule lessened the power of certain Chicago 
warehouses and empowered more remote country dealers.34 Similarly, in 
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American Column, he found that “[t]he absence of [the exchanged] infor-
mation in the hardwood lumber trade enables dealers in the large centers 
more readily to secure advantage over the isolated producer. And the large 
concerns, which are able to establish their own bureaus of statistics, secure 
an advantage over smaller concerns.”35 Even if the information exchange led 
to an increase in prices, that would not make it illegal under the Sherman Act 
since its effect was not coercive but inclusive and had the effect of leveling 
power: “The illegality of a combination under the Sherman Law lies, not in 
its effect upon the price level, but in the coercion thereby affected.”36 
Brandeis’s peroration, like Holmes’s entire dissent, deserves repetition 
in full:
The co-operation which is incident to this plan does not suppress competi-
tion. On the contrary, it tends to promote all in competition which is desir-
able. By substituting knowledge for ignorance, rumor, guess, and suspicion, 
it tends also to substitute research and reasoning for gambling and piracy, 
without closing the door to adventure, or lessening the value of prophetic 
wisdom. In making such knowledge available to the smallest concern, it 
creates among producers equality of opportunity. In making it available, 
also, to purchasers and the general public, it does all that can actually be 
done to protect the community from extortion. If, as is alleged, the Plan tends 
to substitute stability in prices for violent fluctuations, its influence, in this 
respect, is not against the public interest. The evidence in this case, far from 
establishing an illegal restraint of trade, presents, in my opinion, an instance 
of commendable effort by concerns engaged in a chaotic industry to make 
possible its intelligent conduct under competitive conditions.37
In separate American Column dissenting opinions, Holmes and Brandeis 
articulated a comprehensive vision about the free flow of information and 
coercion and dominance. In a country valuing free speech, there should be 
reluctance to condemn voluntary and noncoercive information exchanges, 
particularly those that resulted in the entry of knowledge into the broad 
public domain and the leveling of the commercial playing field. Signifi-
cantly, both Holmes and Brandeis acknowledged that this information 
exchange could lead to higher prices for consumers but found that possibility 
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unimportant to the Sherman Act, which did not aim for “transitory cheap-
ness unprofitable to the community as a whole.”38 Years before, Holmes had 
made clear his view that the Sherman Act’s goal was not strictly to promote 
more intensive competition,39 and now Brandeis joined him in articulating 
an antitrust vision in which collaborative efforts that democratized markets 
through information exchange would be tolerated and encouraged even if 
they diminished price competition at the margin.
Both the common law of misappropriation and antitrust treatment of 
information exchange have evolved considerably since International News 
Service and American Column. Today, the common law of unfair competition 
is no longer the subject of federal law,40 and it is doubtful that INS would 
be liable for unfair competition under most state common law regimes.41 It 
is also doubtful whether the information exchange program in American 
Column would be condemned under antitrust law, involving as it did past 
information, openness to the public, and a highly unconcentrated market.42 
Over time, Holmes and Brandeis largely got their way on hot news and non-
coercive information exchange. But significant questions remained about 
the role of First Amendment values in industrial competition questions. In 
International News Service and American Column, free speech values were 
raised on behalf of the “weaker parties”—the smaller news service and 
“mom and pop” hardwood producers—as brakes on the overexpansion of 
liability in tort and antitrust to the benefit of dominant rivals. How would 
free speech and antitrust interact when the government sought to promote 
First Amendment values in antitrust cases against dominant companies? 
Would Holmes and Brandeis’s vision for the free flow of information as a 
foil to economic dominance translate into a legal impetus for a campaign of 
vigorous trustbusting in the news industry? That question was soon to be 
answered in another case involving the Associated Press.
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THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AND ANTITRUST’S 
FIRST AMENDMENT MANDATE
The INS case handed the Associated Press a powerful weapon—the aid of the courts in preventing competitors from appropriating the AP’s stories. But for the newspaper members of the AP, it was not 
enough to block competitor news agencies from feeding AP stories to their 
member newspapers. The AP newspapers wanted to make sure that they 
could maintain exclusive rights to AP stories in their local markets. So the AP 
adopted bylaws prohibiting all AP members from selling news to nonmem-
bers and granting each member the power to block local newspaper rivals 
from joining the AP. To overcome a competitor’s veto, the applicant would 
have to obtain a positive vote from four-fifths of the AP’s membership—a 
virtually impossible task.
By the time the Justice Department brought an antitrust case against 
the AP in 1942, the organization had 1,200 members, among them most 
of the large newspapers. AP newspapers commanded 96 percent of circu-
lation among morning dailies and 77 percent of evening circulation.43 AP 
membership was particularly important to larger newspapers—of the 65 
morning dailies with average daily circulation in excess of 50,000, all but 
one (the Chicago Sun) held AP membership.44 The AP was widely perceived 
as economically dominant and ideologically pro-business: “Muckrakers 
and radical press commentators ... long argued that the AP service reflected 
the pro-business biases of its large and profitable members. George Seldes, 
Oswald Garrison Villard, Walter Lippman, and Upton Sinclair had all exco-
riated the AP for passing off biased stories on race relations, labor disputes, 
and foreign affairs as objective wire stories.”45 Leading Socialist Eugene Debs 
opined that “if there is in this country a strictly capitalist class institution it 
is the Associated Press.”46
The immediate backdrop to the antitrust case was the economic and 
political rivalry in Chicago between Robert McCormick’s conservative, anti-
New Deal, and isolationist Chicago Tribune and Marshall Field’s upstart, pro-
New Deal, and foreign policy interventionist Chicago Sun, which, as noted, 
was the one large morning daily that had not been able to join the AP.47 The 
Tribune, an incumbent AP member, blocked the Sun’s efforts to join. In 1942, 
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Field persuaded the Antitrust Division to file an antitrust lawsuit challenging 
the legality of the exclusionary bylaw.
Associated Press v. United States pitted two contrasting views about 
the meaning of the First Amendment as applied to news media.48 The first, 
advocated by McCormick and the AP, cast the First Amendment in classical 
liberal terms—as freedom from governmental intervention.49 McCormick 
argued that “the First Amendment was intended solely as a protection of the 
press against government encroachments.”50 Hence, the First Amendment 
could only serve as a negative right as against governmental intervention 
of the kind sought by the Justice Department. It had no affirmative content 
requiring governmental intervention to secure a freer marketplace of ideas. 
Similarly, the AP warned that should the government “become the economic 
arbiter of the newspaper field, it would regulate the field no less effectively 
than did the English kings through their system of licensing and taxation.”51
The second view, propagated by Field and the Justice Department and 
adopted by Judge Learned Hand for a three-judge district court panel before 
the case went to the Supreme Court, viewed the First Amendment as a guar-
antee of “not just classical speech rights, but some kind of positive flow 
of information to the public.”52 Whereas the AP and McCormick focused 
on the free speech right of the established newspapers, Field, the Justice 
Department, and Hand focused on the free speech rights of new newspa-
pers and, especially, the reader. Field asserted that “freedom of the press 
can have its full fruition only if new persons, with fresh points of view, can 
become publishers and compete against existing newspapers”53 and that he 
was “contesting ‘a privileged class with tremendous power and exclusive-
ness’—a group of individuals who connived to corrupt and distort freedom 
of the press.”54 The Justice Department advanced the view that the First 
Amendment assumed that “citizens would be able to obtain all information 
necessary to participate in government decision making” through a “free 
marketplace of ideas” and that “[a]rtificial and unnecessary restraints on 
news sources ... could not be tolerated.”55 In Hand’s vision, antitrust law 
should play a positive role in furthering the First Amendment goal of wide 
dissemination of information and competing viewpoints by ensuring that 
dominant firms were unable to lock down monopolies over news stories: 
“[N]either exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the newspaper 
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industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital of all gen-
eral interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, 
and with as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is 
closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the 
First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to 
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of author-
itative collection.”56
In Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court’s injunction against the AP’s exclusionary bylaws in a sharply 
divided set of opinions, with the Justices expressing a variety of views on 
the contending perspectives on the First Amendment and the antitrust law 
under consideration. In dissent, Justice Owen Roberts endorsed McCormick’s 
classical liberal and anti-statist view: “The decree here approved may well 
be, and I think threatens to be, but a first stop in the shackling of the press, 
which will subvert the constitutional freedom to print or to withhold, to print 
as and how one’s reason or interest dictates. When that time comes, the state 
will be supreme and freedom of the state will have superseded freedom of 
the individual to print, being responsible before the law for abuse of the high 
privilege.”57 By contrast, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion gave 
full-throated voice to the views espoused by Field, the Justice Department, 
and Hand: “The interest of the public is to have the flow of news not tram-
meled by the combined self-interest of those who enjoy a unique constitu-
tional position precisely because of the public dependence on a free press. 
A public interest so essential to the vitality of our democratic government 
may be defeated by private restraints no less than by public censorship.”58
Justice Hugo Black wrote for the majority. As a proponent of strong 
antitrust enforcement but also a First Amendment absolutist, Black could 
not fully embrace Learned Hand’s view that a special interest in promoting a 
free and diverse press was necessary or available to sustain the government’s 
case. This was an ordinary antitrust case: “[T]he restraints on trade in news 
here were no less than those held to fall within the ban of the Sherman 
Act with reference to combinations to restrain trade outlets in the sale of 
tiles, or enameled ironware, or lumber, or women’s clothes, or motion pic-
tures.”59 Black’s choice of generic manufactured goods—tiles, ironware, and 
lumber (perhaps subliminally evoking the American Column scheme?)—as 
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comparators underlined his absolute determination not to carve out a special 
role for antitrust in the news media. The antitrust laws would not serve as 
First Amendment paladins, promoting democracy-enhancing competition 
in cases that could not have been brought if the subject of restraint were tiles 
or women’s garments.
 On the other hand, neither would the First Amendment stand in the way 
of antitrust enforcement in the news industry, any more than it would with 
women’s garments. The problem with the AP’s restraint was that it destroyed 
competition and disincentivized “the initiative which brings newcomers into 
a field of business.”60 As against the ordinary application of the Sherman 
Act, the First Amendment did not stand in the way: “Surely a command that 
the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford 
non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for 
all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.”61
The Associated Press decision partly vindicated, but declined to extend, 
Holmes and Brandeis’s libertarian vision of free and noncoercive flows of 
information. The Sherman Act could be deployed to break down restraints 
that anticompetitively hindered the wide dissemination of news and ideas. 
Dominance and coercion factored into this analysis, as Holmes and Brandeis 
had it. The Associated Press’s “bigness” determined the illegality of its 
bylaws. However, Justice Black refused the further step of granting the Jus-
tice Department a special commission to break down competitive barriers 
involving news media. His opinion normalized antitrust actions involv-
ing the news—they should be governed by the same standards as other 
antitrust cases. As time progressed and the standards applicable to “other 
antitrust cases” shifted in favor of the dominant, the salience of Holmes 
and Brandeis’s founding vision for marketplace democracy eroded as well.
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FROM FREE SPEECH TO LOWER PRICES
Despite Justice Black’s rejection of a special antitrust regime for cases involving competitive restraints in the news media, in the years during and following the Second World War the Justice 
Department became active in policing dominance and coercion in the news 
industry. Between 1940 and 1970, the Justice Department brought 17 antitrust 
cases involving restraints on competition in the newspaper industry62 as well 
as many others involving television and radio. 
During the earlier postwar years, the Justice Department complaints 
often stressed the unique role of newspapers in disseminating a wide variety 
of ideas to the public. For example, in 1967 the Justice Department brought 
an antitrust case against three leading newspaper syndicates—Tribune 
Company, Field Enterprises, and the Hearst Corporation—alleging that the 
syndicates had agreed “not to license the features to any other newspaper 
published within an arbitrary and unreasonably broad territory surrounding 
the contracting newspaper’s city of publication.”63 The Justice Department 
complaint stressed the role of features in ensuring exposure to a diversity 
of perspectives:
Features are a substantial part of the makeup of most daily newspapers 
published in the United States. Some, such as columns, afford information 
and advice on a variety of subjects from a diversity of viewpoints. Other 
features such as comic strips and puzzles are available for the amusement 
of the newspaper’s readers. Inability to supply popular features significantly 
limits a newspaper’s capacity to provide a well-rounded service to its reading 
public.64
 (The 1975 consent decree in the case remains in force to this day, although 
the Justice Department recently requested public comment on the judgment 
as part of its project of cleaning up legacy antitrust judgments.)65
The courts, too, often saw fit to editorialize about the value of antitrust 
in promoting the wide dissemination of viewpoints. In a monopolization 
case against the Kansas City Star, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 
decried “monopolistic control of advertising [which] strikes at the very heart 
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of a competitor’s dissemination of news.”66 In rejecting a tying claim based 
on the requirement of the New Orleans Times-Picayune that advertisers buy 
space in both the morning and evening papers, the Supreme Court waxed on 
about the importance of an economically unrestrained free press to the “flow 
of democratic expression and controversy which maintains the institutions 
of a free society” and endorsed Holmes’s marketplace of ideas—“that right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, 
than through any kind of authoritative selection.”67
Despite occasional obligatory references to the value of economic com-
petition in promoting free speech and democracy, antitrust analysis of the 
news media began to shift from noble ideas about newspapers as guardians 
of the flame of liberty to realism about newspapers as flesh-and-blood busi-
nesses. Congress passed the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, providing 
a limited antitrust exemption for joint operating arrangements between 
newspapers to share production facilities and combine their commercial 
operations.68 The newspapers are required to retain separate editorial and 
reporting staffs and to determine their editorial policies independently, thus 
preserving some viewpoint diversity, but the core economic functions can 
be combined.
With the rise of the consumer welfare standard for antitrust in the 1970s, 
the Justice Department shifted its tone in newspaper cases from information 
flows to higher prices. Consider a 2011 speech by Christine Varney, the Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, entitled “Dynamic Competi-
tion in the Newspaper Industry.”69 Varney begins with the obligatory paeans 
to the “vital role” of the press in our democracy and the complementary spirit 
of antitrust, which favors free competition as the best means of allocating 
resources. But most of the speech treats antitrust enforcement in the newspa-
per industry as the application of normal antitrust principles, concerned with 
“conduct that restrains competition and harms consumers by raising prices, 
restricting output, or reducing innovation.” She treats Associated Press as 
confirming “the principle that newspapers, like other businesses, may not 
unreasonably restrain trade.” On her reading, the Court rejected AP’s First 
Amendment defense and held that “[n]ewspapers ... are subject to the same 
legal standards as are other businesses.”70 The First Amendment is primarily 
relevant for what it does not do—get in the way of the Justice Department’s 
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enforcement actions—than for what it does do.
Similarly, recent complaints by the Justice Department directed against 
newspaper mergers have tended to focus exclusively on economic effects, as 
for example in this allegation of anticompetitive effect in the Department’s 
complaint against the Tribune Company’s acquisition of Freedom Holdings, 
which would have combined control over the Los Angeles Times and the 
Orange County Register: “Tribune’s acquisition of Freedom’s assets would 
eliminate that competition and likely lead to higher prices and lower qual-
ity services for advertisers trying to reach readers in those counties.”71 The 
tendency to focus on higher prices rather than the free flow of information or 
the marketplace of ideas can be seen in antitrust cases involving other news 
media as well. In its unsuccessful challenge to AT&T’s vertical merger with 
Time Warner, the Justice Department articulated two theories of consumer 
harm: First, that “the merger would result in higher prices for consumers of 
traditional subscription television;” and second, that “the merger would 
enable the merged company to impede disruptive competition from online 
video distributors—competition that has allowed consumers greater choices 
at cheaper prices.”72 Both theories, of course, come down to higher prices.
From time to time, the idea of competition and the free flow of informa-
tion as central to democratic values pops back up in antitrust or similar cases 
involving competition. For instance, in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal 
Communications Commission, the Supreme Court returned to the relationship 
between economic competition and free speech, narrowly upholding appli-
cation of the “must carry” provisions of the 1992 Cable Act and observing that 
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources 
is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central 
to the First Amendment.”73 Nonetheless, the free competition/free speech 
project begun by Holmes and Brandeis has largely faded into concerns over 
price effects and efficiency. One would not expect to see a Justice Department 
complaint or judicial decision today premised on Holmes and Brandeis’s 
recognition in American Column that sometimes the free flow of information 
means that consumers must pay more—and that that is an acceptable cost of 
marketplace democracy. As Holmes and Brandeis might see it, the consumer 
has prevailed over the small businessman and the voter.
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THE ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF HOLMES AND 
BRANDEIS’S MARKETPLACE METAPHOR
If there is a central theme in Holmes and Brandeis’s view of markets—covering both the market of ideas and the market of regular products—it is that markets are shaped by a series of conscious choices 
by market participants and by the government and that those choices involve 
tradeoffs. For Holmes, Brandeis, and those that followed in their tradition, 
neither markets nor minds would be “free” if simply left alone from either 
governmental coercion or active structuring by market participants. Con-
structing well-functioning markets—ones that would be free in a thick, and 
not merely superficial, sense—requires paying attention to power dynamics, 
dominance, and coercion. In order for there to be more effective competition, 
courts should sometimes tolerate some degree of competitor collaboration, 
particularly collaboration that results in greater access to information by 
a greater number of market participants. When structuring legal rules on 
informational exclusivity, courts should be aware of the democratic value 
of self-help appropriation, reproduction, and dissemination. And, at times, 
coercive intervention by the state might itself be required to prevent dom-
inant market actors from limiting the free flow of information in ways that 
could imperil both marketplace democracy (in the sense of a market pop-
ulated by a plurality of independent and consumer-responsive firms) and 
political democracy more broadly.
It is understandable that, despite the immense importance of Holmes 
and Brandeis to First Amendment jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s 
continued reference to the marketplace of ideas metaphor,74 the vision of 
these two men of informational freedom as indispensable to the democratic 
role of economic markets faded after the mid-20th century. This was due in 
large part to the fact that antitrust law grew considerably more aggressive on 
principally economic grounds. The Associated Press decision may not have 
endorsed the Holmes/Brandeis vision of a distinctive role for First Amend-
ment values in antitrust cases, but the government still won the case. And 
the rising tide of antitrust enforcement in the postwar era included many 
cases involving newspapers, radio, and television that, while not usually 
cast in free speech terms, may nonetheless have served free speech values 
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by opening channels for a freer flow of ideas and information.
Today, with the ascent of information juggernauts like Facebook, Goo-
gle, and Amazon, the questions posed by Holmes and Brandeis are back 
on the table. Does the marketplace of ideas function best when simply left 
alone by the government, or is some governmental intervention to break 
up dominance and lessen coercion necessary to optimizing free flows of 
information and ideas? Can the government promote the marketplace in 
other ways, particularly by propertizing or de-propertizing certain forms 
of information or requiring (or not requiring) dominant firms to share their 
data with rivals or consumers? And what are the rules governing self-help 
information exchange or other collaboration by smaller actors in the market 
seeking to level the playing field with the dominant firms?
For Holmes and Brandeis, answering these questions would have 
required resorting not to neutral or generally applicable rules about speech 
and competition but to an appreciation of the relative positions of the var-
ious actors in the market—consumers, producers, intermediaries, and the 
like. To return to Brandeis in American Column, “the essence of restraint is 
power; and power may arise merely out of position. Wherever a dominant 
position has been attained, restraint necessarily arises.”75 For Holmes and 
Brandeis, that today’s marketplace might be characterized by an unlimited 
cacophony of voices would not make it free if those voices were subject to 
the dominance and control of a few firms. One can only wonder what their 
antitrust agenda would have been given the immense technological and 
social changes of the last century.
In that vein, it is worth considering what sort of a case might be brought 
today in the Big Tech space on the theory that there is a special role for pro-
competition values in buttressing First Amendment values when dominant 
firms assume hegemonic control over the flow of information. In Associated 
Press, Justice Black did not need a First Amendment boost to the govern-
ment’s antitrust theory in order to find the restrictive bylaw unlawful and, 
by enjoining it, to open up both economic competition and a freer market 
for news and information.76 He did not need it because antitrust expressed 
in purely business terms was sufficiently aggressive to do the job. Today, 
antitrust is considerably narrower in economic terms than it was in 1945. 
Antitrust cases require a showing of harm to consumer welfare or economic 
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efficiency. Are there cases where consumers benefit in economic terms from 
the scale and scope of the Big Tech giants—for example by obtaining social 
media or internet search services for free—and yet the benefit to consumer 
welfare comes at the price of democratic or liberal values as essential chan-
nels of speech and information pass into the controlling hands of a few? 
Questions such as these would surely have interested Holmes and Brandeis.
CONCLUSION
The norms and metaphors of free exchange and competition within an open marketplace are central to both the First Amendment and antitrust law. During the formative years of these ideas, leading 
jurists saw the relationships between free speech and free competition and 
attempted to express them in legal doctrines. While it was comparatively 
easy to cast the value of free information flow in libertarian legal doctrine—as 
reasons for the courts not to impose particular types of liability or propertize 
information—it became harder to make the case for an affirmative deploy-
ment of liability by the government in order to nurture free speech and a 
democratic marketplace. With the rise of the consumer welfare framework, 
the distinctive role that procompetition norms (in antitrust or otherwise) 
might play in nurturing democracy has faded. Holmes and Brandeis’s vision 
for a world of free information flows, unrestrained by dominant firms or the 
forces of coercion, receded into the jurisprudential background as antitrust 
became more aggressive on principally economic terms. In recent years, as 
antitrust law has become less aggressive on economic terms and technolog-
ical shifts have enabled a few dominant firms to amass immense power over 
reams of data and the channels of information exchange, the questions posed 
by Holmes and Brandeis are ripe for renewed consideration.
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